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On the Relation Between Pay and Performance: Presidents of Liberal Arts Colleges 
Imran Lalani 
This paper uses panel data on the salaries and benefits of liberal arts 
college presidents during the period 2001-02 to 2003-04 to understand 
what presidents are rewarded for. We try and develop a basic framework 
in which to understand the president's role in the institution, and attempt 
to explain what some claim is a combination of high wages and relatively 
weak pay for performance. 
Introduction: 
The rising income inequality in America has been the subject of much heated 
debate in the recent past. 'Excessive' executive pay has been a recurrent theme during 
2007 so far, with the Senate gearing up to address this imbalance by trying to pass 
measures such as limiting income tax deductions companies can claim for executives 
leaving the firm during the year. l President Bush also singled out record levels of 
executive compensation as a major issue in his 'State of the Economy' speech in 
January. 2 
A similar story emerges when we examine the executive compensation at 
universities and colleges across America. While the paychecks that executives in higher 
education receive are not as stunning as those in the corporate world, they are hefty in 
their own right, especially when compared with the salaries that faculty at their institutes 
1 Sarah Lueck (2007) 
2 Associated Press (2007) 
command. This rise in pay has been especially great in public institutions, with the 
number of presidents making half a million dollars or more almost doubling between 
2003-04 and 2004-05. Moreover, schools with smaller budgets or less willingness to pay 
often lose their presidents to other universities that pay significantly more; the case in 
point being three major state universities in Iowa that between them have lost 8 
presidents in the last 18 years to institutions that paid significantly more.3 
Unsurprisingly, there has been no shortage of scandal in this sector of the 
economy; the case of Vanderbilt University's chancellor Mr. Gee is a good example. 
Vanderbilt paid over $6 million to renovate the presidential mansion where Mr. Gee and 
his wife resided, as well as paying for parties hosted at the mansion and a personal chef, 
at a cost of over $700,000 per year. Concerns also emerged over the use of marijuana at 
the mansion. While efforts were made to prevent the issuance of "blank-checks" in the 
future, no moves were made to remove Mr. Gee from his position.4 
Given these trends in the larger sphere of higher education, it is of interest to 
2 
attempt to piece together what exactly presidents are being paid to accomplish, why their 
compensation is structured the way it is, and what, if anything can we say about the 
industry based on these findings. This paper will focus exclusively on liberal arts colleges 
due to the particular interests of the author, and will be arranged as follows. Section I will 
comprise of some descriptive statistics, section II a literature review. Section III detail the 
theoretical model used, and IV will describe the data used, and its limitations. Section V 
will describe the empirical analysis undertaken, and section VI will then attempt to 
explain the findings and conclude. 
3 Stephen Burd (2006) 
4 Joanne S. Lublin and Daniel Golden (2006) 
II - Descriptive statistics: 
The introduction mentioned briefly the rising executive pay in the wider higher-
education world, and this section will attempt to illustrate the level of pay in institutions 
during this period. 
Table 1 shows data on the mean salaries of liberal arts college presidents during 
2002-03 and 2004-05. Similar data are displayed for mean benefits, sum of salaries and 
benefits, as well as average faculty salaries and average faculty benefits. 
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The average president's salary in 2004-05 was just over $215,000 a year, and 
when benefits are included, this swells to over $260,000. The distribution is positively 
skewed (skewness = 1.43), hence the mean is pulled above the median as a result of very 
high total pay towards the upper tail. The 75th percentile is $320,000, and in 2004-05 
there were 6 institutions that paid salaries of over half a million dollars, and one president 
earned over a million (though this incorporated his retirement benefits and deferred 
compensation). 
On the other hand, during the same year, the average faculty salary was $58,629, 
and though the distribution of faculty salaries is also positively skewed (skewness = 0.38) 
it is much less so than that of the college presidents. 
It is therefore not surprising that to many faculty members, the levels of 
presidential compensation seem far out of line. However, the argument is made that 
presidents are the CEOs of institutions with operating budgets of tens of millions of 
dollars, and as such are actually paid much less than their counterparts in the corporate 
world. 
Table 1 (Comparative Statistics): 
Liberal arts college presidents5: 
S I a ary: 
Year N Mean Median 25tn 
Percentile 
2002-03 186 206,345 200,417 160,111 
2003-04 195 209,930 203,458 155,774 
2004-05 215 215,384 210,062 165,945 
Bonus' 
Year N Mean Median 25tn 
Percentile 
2002-03 186 42,155 29,357 17,919 
2003-04 195 48,589 32,322 17,912 
2004-05 215 44,783 30,886 17,023 
Combined total' 
Year : N Mean Median 25 th 
Percentile 
2002-03 186 248,500 234,358 181 ,526 
2003-04 195 258,520 244,451 179,873 
2004-05 215 260,168 249,702 185,092 
Faculty Salaries in liberal arts collegel: 
A I verage sa ary: 
Year N Mean Median 25tn 
Percentile 
2002-03 208 55,557 54,339 48,543 
2003-04 211 56,947 55,538 48,729 
2004-05 210 58,629 56,936 49,921 
Avera~e benefit spending per faculty member: 
Year N Mean Median 25m 
Percentile 
2002-03 208 14,979 14,858 11 ,837 
2003-04 211 15,581 15,404 12,688 
2004-05 210 16,132 16,294 12,824 
5 Author's calculations. Data taken from the Chronicle of Higher Education. 




























II - Literature review: 
In order to examine executive compensation in liberal arts colleges, it is necessary 
to first get a better sense of what these institutions aim to accomplish. Liberal arts 
colleges are quite different from most other institutions of higher learning in the United 
States. For example, Liberal Arts Colleges typically offer less in the way of pre-
professional training, do not place much emphasis on an in-house graduate program 
(which competes with undergraduate programs over the institution's resources), place a 
relatively smaller weight on faculty research (especially when compared to research 
universities. As a result, liberal arts colleges focus almost exclusively on undergraduate 
education. In this sense, we can view Liberal Arts Colleges as offering a very specific 
product within the higher education universe, but one which can be studied using the 
kinds of tools developed to address the typical institution of higher education. 
Rothschild and White (1995) focus on education technology having mUltiple 
inputs and outputs. The production function has constant returns to scale, and students are 
both inputs and outputs in the process (since education is a jointly consumed good). The 
college internalizes this externality through price discrimination (financial aid dependent 
on quality, defined in some way, of each student). The production technology produces 
units of human capital, which are then allocated amongst students. The net price to each 
student is therefore the tuition less the amount that student contributes to the human 
capital of his schoolmates. Therefore, the tuition for each student should ideally be equal 
to her net human capital increment. Hence when making the decision about which 
colleges to apply to, and which colleges to accept, each student looks to maximize her net 
human capital within her budget constraint. On the basis of these ideas, we might begin 
.. 
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to think of liberal arts colleges competing over a pool of applicants; varying the effective 
price paid by each potential student for the chosen level of institutional quality to attract a 
certain body of students. 
Turning to the issue of executive compensation in these sorts of institutions leads 
us to Hallock (2002), who estimated the impact of performance on the highest paid 
officers of non-profit organizations. His results show that firm size, the ratio of program 
spending to total spending, and total fundraising were significant drivers of non-profit 
executives' pay. Carroll, Hughes and Lukesitch (2005) formulate a very similar model, 
except they define performance as the ratio of revenue from each activity to its associated 
cost. In their sub sample of educational non-profits, they found a positive impact of 
performance on compensation, though for fundraising, this remained statistically 
insignificant. When they included an interaction term between program services and 
fundraising, they found a positive and significant relationship with compensation. Hence 
it is not enough to fund raise; one must put that money to good use. 
Ehrenberg (2000), and O'Connell (2005) are two papers that try and empirically 
estimate what presidents of institutes of higher education are rewarded for, and find some 
interesting results. Ehrenberg (2000), using panel data for 1992-93 to 1996-97 finds that 
compensation is positively related to size of institution, and institutional quality, but also 
finds that for presidents who have a tenure of four or more years, change in compensation 
is not related to fundraising success. O'Connell (2005) finds similar results, using cross-
sectional data for the period 1995-96 and focusing solely on liberal arts colleges. The 
paper also finds that pay is negatively related to alumni giving rate. This seems off-
putting at first, but makes more sense when one realizes that given a high historic level of 
alumni giving, there is likely to be lesser emphasis on increasing that particular statistic 
than a college with a historically low rate of alumni giving. 
The rate of alumni giving may in fact be a poor indicator of presidential success, 
since it is much more open to distortion, and it is not exactly clear what it measures; a 
high alumni giving rate does not necessarily reflect a high rate of fundraising, but could 
reflect something else entirely. For example, colleges knowing that alumni giving rates 
are often used by ranking agencies can encourage their alumni to give smaller donations 
spread out over time; a one time 15 dollar gift can be made into a 5 dollar gift each year 
for three years. It is for these reasons that this paper does not use the alumni giving rates 
as an explanatory variable, and instead uses actual fundraising levels. 
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The paper itself can best be thought of as an extension of the O'Connell (2005) 
paper, where it differs from that paper is we attempt to estimate performance based pay 
on presidential salary, benefits, and a measure of estimated deferred compensation 
(whereas O'Connell focuses on salary alone). By taking this approach we hope to shed 
some light on the different roles of these components, and hope to gain a better 
understanding of compensation packages. Moreover, O'Connell does not include tenure 
of presidents in his regression, while we do. We also attempt to see if relative 
performance measures are considered important when deciding pay, and introduce a new 
fundraising variable, the top gifts in various categories (see next section) to tackle the 
issue of attribution. 
111 - Model 
In the case of for-profit firms, executive compensation is often viewed as a means 
of ameliorating the principal-agent problem; that is structuring the incentives ofthe agent 
-
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to bring the executive's (agent's) interests in line with the interests of the principal. In the 
case of liberal arts colleges, there is no explicit "shareholder value" to maximize, and so 
we develop a basic framework wherein colleges compete over students on the basis of 
(educational) quality at a given effective price. 
We begin by making the following assumptions: 
1. Liberal Arts Colleges are monopolistic competitors, and they try to 
differentiate their products by changing level of quality for (an effective) level 
of price. 
2. Assume that demand is dependent on quality and price s.t. people are willing 
to pay more for a higher quality product, but at a diminishing rate. 
3. Since there is status associated with teaching at or working for a college with 
a particular level of quality, there is an incentive for teachers and trustees to 
maximize quality of their institutions. 
4. Education is jointly consumed, i.e. students are also inputs in the education 
process, and so if you want to get the "best" education, you should have the 
"best" students possible at your college 7 
5. Education is considered societally beneficial, and that therefore there is 
pressure to educate the maximum number of students possible given the 
budget constraints faced. 
Given these points, we then modify Newhouse's model of a Hospital to the Liberal Arts 
College. Assume that a Liberal Arts college seeks to maximize quality (Qual): 
7 "Best" students can be defined as those having characteristics like academic excellence, minorities, 
different socio-economic status. The argument is made that financial aid is a way to internalize the positive 
externality of different students as well as a way to gather maximum consumer surplus for each college 
9 
Max Qual = f(Cost,Quantity) 
s.t. Revenue ;;:: Cost 
Qual 2: Qualmin 
Price = p 
Where: 
Cost = Cost associated with educating n students at the level of quality Q 
Total Revenue = Fee income from students + Endowment Income 
Qualmin = Minimum allowed level of quality (i.e. minimum needed for accrediting) 
The effective Price of the product is p, 
aQual ;;:: 0, and aQual ~ 0 
aCost aQ 
Based on the above problem, the college will pick some optimal level of Quality 
and Quantity, given the effective price for a student is p. Now assume that fundraising is 
allowed. In this case the total revenue is higher than before, and the college is able to now 
re-optimize and reach a higher indifference curve.8 Hence if Liberal Arts Colleges 
compete on the basis of quality at a given effective price, fundraising plays a vital role. 
Knowing that one of the primary responsibilities of the president is to fundraise, we 
should expect to see a strong relationship between fundraising and presidential pay. 
Armed with a basic idea of what the objective function of the trustees is, we can 
now model the relationship of the president and the trustees in terms of the principal-
agent framework. In this case the "principal" would refer to the trustees and "the agent", 
the president. We modify the Grossman and Hart (1983) framework to explain this 
relationship. 
8 For a more detailed explanation, see Newhouse (1970) pp. 67-69 
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The principal wishes the agent to pick the optimal level of quantity and quality at 
a given price. Further, she wishes the agent to maximize net fundraising (as shown 
above). Assume that the principal can exert different levels of effort, and that higher 
levels of effort 9 increase the probability of a higher institutional indifference curve being 
reached. Moreover, the agent experiences disutility of effort and positive utility of 
income; hence in order for the agent to be willing to exert a certain level of effort, the 
positive utility of income she gets must at least equal the disutility of that level of effort. 
Hence we can represent the agent's utility function as: 
U(a,I) = K(a)V(I) 
Where I is the income the agent receives, K(a) is the disutility of effort level a, and V(I) 
is the positive utility of income I, s. t. 
Hence we see an increasing utility of income, but decreasing marginal utility of 
income, and that there is a minimum income level Imin, which corresponds to the agent's 
next best alternative. Below this level of utility the agent prefers to work elsewhere (or 
enjoy leisure). 
9 Effort is not restricted to time spent working, but contains other factors like difficult decisions on 
downsizing etc. which are hard to observe. 
.. 
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We can represent the effect of the agent choosing effort level a on the institution' s 
wellbeing as: 
n 
B(a) = L IIi (a) qi 
i=1 
Where: 
IIi (a) is the probability that quality level qj will be reached given effort level a. 
The principal fmds it difficult to observe the level of effort the president is 
expending, but if we assume that the principal knows the probability function of different 
levels of effort on fundraising success, then she can reward outcomes instead of effort 
and seek to maximize expected effort, or bring expected effort into line with some 
specified level of effort that the principal desires from the agent. 
Let I = { 11, 12 , h, ... , In } 
Where Ii is the income for the agent if the college achieves quality level qj, 
Given this, the agent seeks to choose effort level a s.t. 
n 
max L I1i (a) U(a,l) 
i=1 
And the principal, knowing this, first calculates minimum Ii s.t. it enforces a level of 
effort a* 
n 





L TI j (a*) U(a*, Ii) 2: L n (a) U(a, Ii ) Va < a* 
i=1 i=1 
n 
L n (a*) U(a* I-) > U . 1 , 1 _ mm 
i=1 
i.e. minimize the expected payment to the agent given expected utility of payment of 
action a* must be greater than or equal to the agent's minimum desired utility, and the 
expected utility of payment or action a* must be greater than or equal to the expected 
utility of any other action a, where a < a*. There may be values of a* for which this is not 
possible, and if so, then the principal takes the cost of inducing that particular level of 
effort as 00. 
Knowing the values of Ii, the principal now sets about optimizing her objective 
function (Le. maximizing quality) 
n n 
max L TIi (a*) qi - L TIi (a*) Ii 
i=1 i=1 
In the standard principal agent model in the for-profit world, it is assumed that the 
level of effort cannot be observed, but the principal knows the utility function of the 
agent and can structure payment contingent on what it is the principal is trying to 
maximize S.t. the expected value of the agent's effort is equal to the level the principal 
wishes (see above). In the for-profit case, the principal often seeks to maximize 
shareholder value, as this is a clearly observable market-based measure of company 
13 
performance. However, in the case of the Liberal Arts College, no such single gauge of 
value is readily available. It is true that there are a broad range ofmetrics that can be used 
to judge an institution's success, e.g. different types ofrankings, various statistics etc. 
however these indicators are not as clear, as regulated, as widely traded, and not as easily 
accessible as share-price information. While it is true that share prices may be 
manipulated, the fact that there is a well developed market for these commodities, 
coupled with considerable regulatory oversight means that this measure is potentially a 
truer or clearer sense of value than college rankings which do not share these features, 
and may therefore be less reflective of 'true' value; imperfections may take longer to be 
identified, etc. 
Hence if we assume that effort levels are unobservable directly in this instance, 
then the question becomes how to gauge the firm's performance, and the agent's 
influence on it. Faced with this problem, it is useful to go back to the modification of the 
Newhouse model presented earlier. If colleges are competing over quality at a given 
effective price level, then it makes sense to view the role of the agent as trying to set the 
effective price, quality and quantity level at the 'optimal' level. In order to ensure that the 
agent does, in fact try to achieve this target, we would expect some proportion of 
compensation to depend upon these variables. In the next section, we try and empirically 
estimate this relationship. We hope to show the extent of the 'pay for performance', and 
document the nature of this relationship. 10 
10 Alternately, if there does not exist a pay for perfonnance relationship, we will attempt to explain the 
reasons for this given what we know about the fIrms organization and the market. 
--
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IV - Data used, and its limitations: 
Our study uses panel data on the 220 institutions defined as liberal arts 
baccalaureate colleges by the 2000 Carnegie Classification over the period 2001-02 to 
2003-04. These institutions are primarily undergraduate colleges with major emphasis on 
baccalaureate programs, and award at least half of their baccalaureate degrees in liberal 
arts fields. 
Information on salaries and benefits paid to the presidents of these colleges must 
be reported to the IRS by law annually. This data has been collected by the Chronicle of 
Higher Education for academic years 1995-96 to 2004-05. We use the subset for the 
period 2002-03 to 2004-05, and combine this with data on president's gender, tenure, the 
religious association of school, and if the president was serving as an interim president 
which was collected through web research. These data are not perfect by any means; 
problems range from sometimes failing to report deferred compensation "earned" during 
the year, to failing to report additional income the president may receive from serving on 
related organizations like university foundations. Institutions often undervalue or fail to 
report perks associated with the presidential office; living in a beautiful mansion or 
having a private chef etc. Moreover, the benefits reported are the total of health, and 
pension plans as well as the total deferred compensation that were paid or designated that 
year. As such it is not a "clean" measure of a bonus (which would ostensibly reflect 
performance). That being said, the form 990 reports are the best source of presidential 
compensation data that the author is aware of. 
Information on average faculty salaries and benefits for these institutions, and 
average SAT scores over the period 2001-02 to 2003-04 is taken from the Integrated 
15 
Post-Secondary Education Data System (IPEDS). Average facility salaries are computed 
by summing the expenditures on assistant, associate and full professors and dividing by 
the numbers of professors in each group. To estimate the average SAT score, we add the 
25th percentile of the verbal and math score to the 75 th percentile verbal and math score 
and divide the resulting number by two. For institutions that had a majority of students 
submit ACT scores, the average ACT score (calculated similarly) was converted to its 
SAT equivalent based on collegeboard guidelines. I I 
Information on total fundraising per student, full time equivalent emollment, and 
total endowment per student was taken from the Council for Aid to Education'S 
Voluntary Support of Education Survey's "calculated statistics" and "endowment details" 
for the period 2001-02 to 2003-04. 
It is important to keep in mind when decisions on presidential compensation are 
being made; salary decisions are made in the spring or summer preceding the academic 
year, and so we take care to use information available to trustees at that time. Hence to 
examine 2002-03 compensation data, we use the data outlined above from 2001-02, and 
follow the same pattern for other years. 
v - Empirics: 
Based on the ideas expressed in the previous section, we would expect 
presidential pay to be related to the quality of the incoming class, the level of fundraising 
success (income), the endowment level (wealth), and the size of the institution. 
11 This is the same procedure used by Ehrenberg (2000) 
16 
In addition, we would expect the level of pay to be determined by characteristics 
of the presidents and the institutions they serve12• For example the president's gender, the 
number of years they have served as president of that institution, and whether it is the 
president's last year at the institution is likely to have an impact on the salary they 
command. Further, if the institution is religiously affiliated, it might place less emphasis 
on market forces and hire like-minded presidents who may be willing to accept lower 
wages when part of an organization that shares and promotes their religious beliefs. 13 
We would expect that variables reflecting the income and wealth of the school 
would tend to matter as determinants of presidential pay. Hence institutions that have 
higher endowments per student, and higher average faculty pay are likely to pay their 
presidents more than those with lower figures. This could come about from a number of 
possible sources; colleges may, for example pay professors and administrators what they 
can, rather than simply the market clearing wage, as an incentive for loyalty or better 
faculty relations etc. Moreover, ifthis is the case, and demand for presidents is greater 
than supply, then there may even be a case where presidents will demand higher 
compensation from colleges that have higher endowments and faculty pay than in other 
schools, all else equal. We must therefore be very careful when interpreting the co-
efficient on the endowment and faculty salaries variables; a positive co-efficient could for 
example, be seen as rewarding a president for past performance (possible not even her 
own). However this is not necessarily the case, it is more a question of historical pay 
12 We try an institution fixed-effects regression to account for some of the characteristics of institutions that 
lend themselves to presidential pay, but find no statistically significant results. This may be since our 
sample is only over a three year period and therefore does not contain sufficient variation to be picked up. 
\3 Note: The author was unable to obtain reliable information on previous presidential tenure, and was 
unable to include it in the regression analysis conducted. Ehrenberg (2000) also finds that this variable is 
insignificant in liberal arts colleges. 
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rates, as well as endowment growth (please see the following section for a more detailed 
examination). 
Moreover, we would expect the level offundraising per student to be particularly 
important as a determinant of presidential pay, as this is one of the central duties ofthe 
president, and (as shown above) this is a vital activity for all liberal arts colleges. 
Presidents in their last year are often awarded hefty retirement packages, part of 
which are logged as deferred compensation and therefore are booked as part of the 
benefits figure reported to the IRS. We try and account for this by including a dummy for 
the president's last year. 
Interim presidents are likely to serve a slightly different role than longer-term 
appointees; they may for example simply be filling a position for a semester until a 
replacement is found and may not be expected to perform at the same level, or have the 
same priorities as a full-time president. Hence we removed all interim presidents from 
our sample. 
There are many measures of student quality, but the one that we selected was 
average SAT scores. This variable has an added advantage in that the average SA T score 
affects the level of selectivity of an institution and therefore its applicant pool, and the 
fraction of students who accept offers of admission (yield). Moreover it also affects the 
effective price the institution can charge each student, as higher scores tend to raise a 
student's willingness to pay. SAT scores are also widely reported for the colleges in the 
sample over this period, and were therefore felt this was the best statistic for our purpose. 
As noted in the sections above, since colleges are competing over a common pool 
of applicants, it is not absolute performance that should matter most, but performance 
relative to the market. That is to say we would expect a fundraising level of $1,000 per 
student to be rewarded differently during a year when the economy is in recession, and 
during a period of rapid economic growth. To this end we tabulate average revenue 
variables per period and include the log difference of these and the respective variables 
for each institution. 
18 
We discussed earlier that benefits as reported on the form 990 include sum of total 
health and pension plans as well as deferred compensation. Since deferred compensation 
is one of the main sources for performance linked pay in non-profit companies,14 a 
cleaner estimate would be useful. We assume that the benefit spending per president at a 
given institution (e.g. healthcare plans etc.) is not very different from that on the average 
faculty member. As such by subtracting the average benefit data from the presidential 
benefit data, we hope to arrive at a better indicator of deferred compensation. 
Our first set of regression results follows on the next page. 
14 Vogel and Quart (2005) 
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President Salary and Benefits Equations (2002-03 to 2004-05 sample)15 
Log Salary Log Benefits Log Total Log Estimated 
Deferred Comp 
Constant 8.536271 5.075098 8.075105 2.991118 
(22.70612) (4.74366) (17.8543) (1.77329) 
Female -0.04226 0.051644 -0.01447 0.241348 
(-1.20071) (0.53251) (-0.34169) (1.59216) 
Number of years at 0.002825 0.01778 0.006123 0.021876 
present institution (0.92121) (2.02176) (1.65935) (1.61638) 
Last year at 0.001438 0.107371 0.044288 0.085028 
Institution (0.03603) (0.97295) (0.92253) (0.4975) 
Average SAT 0.000793 0.001436 0.000857 0.310881 
scores (3.45226) (2.19414) (3.10318) (1.00224) 
Religion -0.24074 0.056994 -0.21462 0.002389 
(-3.44782) (0.29341) (-2.55493) (2.31279) 
Log Enrollment 0.245875 0.245127 0.275565 0.250977 
(5.7211 ) (2.02566) (5.32977) (1.34355) 
Log of Endowment 0.06831 0.135302 0.084487 0.2183 
per student (2.39383) (1.7155) (2.46103) (1.7991) 
Log of Fundraising 0.028902 0.034132 0.043661 -0.04409 
per student (0.88843) (0.36468) (1.11559) (-0.29388) 
Number of 265 265 265 265 
Observations 
R-Squared 0.41 0.18 0.38 0.16 
From the results above, it seems that it is the salary variable that is most 
influenced by performance, with salary and total pay providing a much better fit as 
measured by R-squared than either benefits, or our estimated deferred compensation. 
15 T -Statistics reported below co-efficient estimates 
-
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Since deferred compensation is thought to playa major role in incentivizing non-
profit management, it is strange that the model should have such limited predictive 
power. On the other hand, within this model, we find that the number of years in office 
both has a stronger impact on benefits than salary, and is statistically significant. This 
would seem to indicate that benefits seem to provide a different role from pay, serving as 
both an incentive to stay with the college (or reward retirement) as well as helping to 
induce the required level of effort. Given the much weaker predictive power associated 
with using this model for benefits, we may also imagine that benefits are meant to reward 
some other measures of performance not included in the model. 
If we examine our estimated deferred compensation within this model, we find it 
does not add much to the analysis in terms of a better fit. This leads us to believe that 
either presidential benefits are very different from the average faculty benefits (and hence 
that our 'clean' measure of deferred compensation is actually pretty dirty), or that 
deferred compensation is not one of the main ways of rewarding performance as 
measured above. 
Keeping in mind that all findings are ceteris paribus (other variables in the model 
held constant) from the results above total presidential pay rises by about 8.6% for every 
100 point increase in average SAT scores. Tenure is related in only a limited fashion to 
total pay, with each additional year in office yielding only a 0.6% increase in total pay. 
As expected, religious affiliation of school leads to about a 20% decrease in total 
presidential pay. For every 10% increase in student enrollment, there is a 2.5% increase 
in presidential pay. The effect of gender is statistically insignificant, over this period, as 
is the dummy for the last year in office. There is a weak relationship between endowment 
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per student and total pay, but what is most surprising is that the relationship between 
fundraising per student and total pay is not statistically significant. 
Expanding the model to account for relative performance, we get: 
President Salary and Benefits Equations (2002-03 to 2004-05 sample)16 
Log Salary Log Benefits Log Total Log Estimated 
Deferred Comp 
Constant 10.13199 9.318563 9.885522 8.015928 
(21 .74156) (4.87748) (16.44945) (2.76837) 
Female -0.05287 -0.06654 -0.01898 0.259838 
(-0.97418) (-0.35549) (-0.27123) (0.8776) 
Number of years at 0.002676 -0.02303 -0.00367 -0.03967 
present institution (0.57526) (-1.41678) (-0.6121) (-1 .62435) 
Last year at 0.062949 0.827427 0.286968 1.12202 
Institution (0.98968) (3.7719) (3.49862) (3.46296) 
Differenced average 0.000157 -0.00072 -5.4E-05 -0.00052 
SAT scores (0.43608) (-0.57072) (-0.11505) (-0.26914) 
Religion 0 0 0 0 
(0) (0) (O) (0) 
Log Enrollment 0.209004 0.117518 0.225369 0.204645 
(3.86819) (0.62152) (3.23447) (0.72153) 
Log difference of 0.05256 -0.02209 0.062217 0.011582 
Endowment per (2.56513) (-0.21775) (2.3546) (0.07656) 
student 
Log difference of 0.028067 0.14059 0.05868 0.110374 
Fundraising per (1 .07648) (1.56175) (1.74525) (0.8025) 
student 
N 265 265 265 265 
R-Squared 0.42 0.28 0.42 0.21 
16 Expressions ofthe form 'Log difference of Endowment per student' refers to 'Log Endowment per 
student at institution (i) - Log average Endowment per student in sample' 
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This table shows some very interesting results. When we include variables 
relating performance relative to the market, (e.g. the log ofthe difference between the 
total fundraising per student in an institution and the average fundraising per student for 
that year etc.), we find that relative fundraising success becomes significant (though its 
magnitude remains quite small) to presidential pay. Hence, for every ten percent increase 
above average annual fundraising per student (for the sample, holding all other variables 
constant), presidential pay increases by 0.29%. 
Relative SAT scores do not seem to influence presidential pay, and neither does 
the number of years of tenure, or gender. Interestingly, religious affiliation of the school 
fails to have any impact on presidential pay when we use this model, suggesting that 
religious institutions reward relative performance much the same way that secular 
schools do. 
Again, this model loses significant predictive power when we try and estimate it 
using benefits data or our estimated deferred compensation variable, which provides 
some limited support for the ideas discussed earlier. 
One possible reason for finding that fundraising is not closely related to 
presidential pay is the question of attribution; to what extent can fundraising be attributed 
to the president, and tow what extent is it the result of work done by the development 
office or other sources. Presidents might be expected to restrict their fundraising activities 
to high net-worth individuals, and hence a better indication of fundraising success might 
be by looking at the largest gifts each year. The Chronicle of Higher Education publishes 
data on the three largest bequests, individual, corporate, and foundation gifts, and we re-
estimated our models using this total, but found that these remained inconclusive. While 
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the top three gifts in these categories may reflect presidential fundraising more clearly 
than the aggregate number, it is likely to under-represent fundraising (since the president 
is likely to secure more than just three gifts, or may secure a number of smaller gifts etc.). 
Rewarding endowment levels and not fundraising levels is problematic for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, the growth of the endowment per student is dependent on the 
yield on the endowment (which is out of the control of the president, apart from possibly 
discussing with trustees which investment professional to hire), the amount which the 
endowment is drawn upon (which may create perverse incentives; for example forgoing 
capital expenditures that may increase school quality and attract 'better' students as it 
reduces the endowment level) and finally the amount of capital contributed to it at the 
end of each period (another possible perverse incentive, as revenue may be invested into 
the endowment rather than being used to pay for quality or price improvements). On the 
other hand, fundraising seems to be a much better instrument, since according to our 
model, fundraising plays an important role in maintaining the competitiveness of the 
institution, and seems less open to perverse incentives, especially when rewarded relative 
to the market. 
VI - Summary and Conclusions: 
Our paper seems to show some limited evidence for the hypothesis that presidents 
are rewarded for institutional performance. SAT scores of incoming freshmen, as well as 
the level of endowment per student, average faculty salaries and the size of the institution 
seem to be drivers of presidential pay. Presidential benefits seem to be designed more 
towards maintaining a relationship with the college, and encouraging presidents to remain 
-
in office (or rewarding retirement). There is some limited evidence for relative 
fundraising being more important to trustees than absolute levels of fundraising. 
However, the importance placed in endowment levels may also reflect a longer-term 
view of the trustees; by ensuring a large endowment, trustees are potentially looking to 
assure that the institution endures for a loner period of time than it might otherwise do. 
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These results suggest some interesting insights into what trustees value. While 
Quality ofthe institution is important (as measured by SAT scores) as a driver of 
presidential pay, fundraising (which according to our model should be a driver of 
quality), does not seem to be emphasized by trustees. This may mean that when trustees 
sit down to decide presidential pay for the preceding period, they pay more attention to 
realized quality improvements over fundraising success. However, presidents realize the 
importance offundraising to overall quality, and therefore seek to carry out the level that 
yields the level of quality that the college's trustees desire. 
The relatively scarce evidence for performance linked pay may reflect the 
complicated nature ofthe president's job; it may be difficult to restrict it to performance 
in just a few areas, and may involve a number of additional functions such as faculty 
r:elations, alumni events etc. or it may be that pay serves as a mechanism to ensure 
presidents stay with the college and continue to perform. Hence, it may well be a sort of 
modified 'efficiency wage' that is being paid to college presidents; by offering a 
president large salary and benefits package, the option of a potentially long and 
rewarding relationship, coupled with possible dismissal for failing to meet certain basic 
levels of performance (or malfeasance etc.) colleges make employment as executive itself 
very appealing. In order to continue this employment, the president must therefore exert a 
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certain level of effort and achieve a certain level of performance. Akerlof (1984) 
proposes that some labor contracts may be viewed as partial gift exchanges, in the sense 
that when firms pay employees above-market wages, employees reciprocate by exerting 
higher levels of effort than the baseline required, and that this additional effort reflects in 
some sense a 'gift' to the employer. Moreover efficiency wages make sense in a setting 
where the objective function of the institution is difficult to measure, as are notions of 
institutional performance. Since there are fairly complicated and possibly different 
objectives for institutions in our sample, and since there is no standard way to measure 
these objectives, highly incentivized pay may create either perverse incentives, or lead to 
focusing solely on some aspects of the job at the expense of others. Lastly, the lack of a 
strong pay for performance relationship may also be explained if effort levels are more 
easily observed, and if each college suffers shocks to the admissions process 
independently of its competitors. In this scenario, we would expect that presidents would 
be rewarded directly for the amount of effort they expend, and not observed outcomes. 
Indeed, rewarding presidents for performance in this case would penalize them. 17 
17 The author is indebted to V.V. Chari, Professor of Economics at the University of Minnesota for this 
insight. 
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AI!I~endix: 
Salary and Benefits Equations (2002-03 to 2004-05 sample)18 
Log Salary Benefits Total 
Constant 3.789048 2.508507 3.613934 
2.4687 0.57574 1.94219 
Female -0.05233 0.046516 -0.02392 
-1.50663 0.47724 -0.56821 
Number of years at 0.001701 0.017284 0.005066 
present institution 0.56065 1.95452 1.37722 
Last year at -0.0035 0.105201 0.039643 
Institution -0.08932 0.95158 0.83332 
Average SAT 0.000184 0.00111 0.000285 






Log Enrollment per 0.205363 0.22354 0.237493 
student 4.65668 1.77043 4.44202 
Log Endowment 0.040247 0.120365 0.058115 
per student 1.36943 1.45532 1.63105 
Log Fundraising 0.034207 0.036497 0.048646 
per student 1.06871 0.38911 1.25361 
Log Average 0.55179 0.297837 0.518541 
Faculty Salaries 3.18665 0.60773 2.47012 
N 265 265 265 
R-Squared 0.431 0.178 0.395 
18 When we include average faculty salary information, the significance and magnitude of some of the 
performance variables is reduced, since they affect faculty pay as well. 
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Salary and Benefits Equations (2002-03 to 2004-05 sample) 
Log Salary Benefits Total 
Constant 16.86288 16.86288 10.4106 
3.57 3.57 5.78936 
Female -0.05355 -0.05355 -0.01238 
-0.28729 -0.28729 -0.1743 
Number of years at -0.01151 -0.01151 -0.00213 
present institution -0.63277 -0.63277 -0.31948 
Last year at 0.812427 0.812427 0.291735 
Institution 3.66748 3.66748 3.45848 
Average SAT 0.0009 0.0009 0.000315 
scores 0.60232 0.60232 0.55397 
Religion 0 0 0.000315 
0 0 0.55397 
Log Enrollment per 0.254124 0.254124 0.244218 




per student -0.10636 
-0.10636 2.01554 
Log Fundraising 0.129665 0.129665 0.055984 
per student 1.37433 1.37433 1.56409 
Log Average -1.00427 -1.00427 -0.10055 
Faculty Salaries -1.67743 -1.67743 -0.45521 
N 265 265 265 
R-Squared 0.432 0.267 0.413 
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Presidential Pay and Benefits (Using largest giftS)19 
Log Salary Benefits Total 
Constant 8.685736 5.25625 8.25462 
24.02725 5.12878 18.9671 
Female -0.03924 0.054972 -0.01073 
-1.11563 0.56813 -0.25352 
Number of years at 0.0032 0.018438 0.006542 
present institution 1.04204 2.10721 1.76974 
Last year at 0.002125 0.10764 0.044848 
Institution 0.05315 0.97484 0.93174 
Average SAT 0.000813 0.001476 0.000884 
scores 3.55018 2.27848 3.20688 
Religion -0.24863 0.051401 -0.2233 
-3.55333 0.26416 -2.65075 
Log Enrollment 0.23529 0.232684 0.254818 
per student 5.4118 1.91324 4.86827 
Log of Endowment 0.082157 0.149922 0.101204 
per student 3.07087 2.013 3.14209 
Log of Top 9 Gifts -7.8E-05 -0.00052 0.008618 
-0.00317 -0.00753 0.2896 
Number of 265 265 265 
Observations 
R-Squared 0.407 0.178 0.378 
'1 have adhered to the Honor Code on this Assignment' 
1mran Lalani 
19 The Chronicle of Higher Education publishes data on the three largest bequests, individual, corporate, 
and foundation gifts 
